Locky is Back Asking for Unpaid Debts
On June 21, 2016, FireEye’s Dynamic Threat Intelligence (DTI) identified an increase in JavaScript contained within spam emails. FireEye analysts determined the increase was the result of a new Locky ransomware spam campaign.
As shown in Figure 1, Locky spam activity was uninterrupted until June 1, 2016, when it stopped for nearly three weeks. During this period, Locky was the most dominant ransomware distributed in spam email. Now, Locky distribution has returned to the level seen during the first half of 2016.
Figure 1. Locky spam activity in 2016
Figure 2 shows that the majority of Locky spam email detections between June 21 and June 23 of this year were recorded in Japan, the United States and South Korea.
Figure 2. Locky spam by country from June 21 to June 23 of this year
The spam email – a sample shown is shown in Figure 3 – purports to contain an unpaid invoice in an attached ZIP archive. Instead of an invoice, the ZIP archive contains a Locky downloader written in JavaScript.
Figure 3. Locky spam email
JavaScript based Downloader Updates
In this campaign, few updates were seen in both the JavaScript based downloader and the Locky payload.
The JavaScript downloader does the following:
- Iterates over an array of URLs hosting the Locky payload.
- If a connection to one of the URLs fails, the JavaScript sleeps for 1,000 ms before continuing to iterate over the array of URLs.
- Uses a custom XOR-based decryption routine to decrypt the Locky payload.
- Ensures the decrypted binary is of a predefined size. In Figure 4 below, the size of the decrypted binary had to be greater than 143,360 bytes and smaller than 153,660 bytes to be executed.
Figure 4. Payload download function in JavaScript
5. Checks (Figure 5) that the first two bytes of the binary contain the “MZ” header signature.
Figure 5: MZ header check
6. Executes the decrypted payload by passing it the command line parameter, “123”.
Locky Payload Updates
The Locky ransomware downloaded in this campaign requires a command line argument to properly execute. This command line parameter, “123” in the analyzed sample, is passed to the binary by the first stage JavaScript-based downloader. This command line parameter value is used in the code unpacking stage of the ransomware. Legitimate binaries typically verify the number of arguments passed or compare the command line parameter with the expected value and gracefully exit if the check fails. However in the case of this Locky ransomware, the program does not exit (Figure 6) and the value received as a command line parameter is added to a constant value defined in the binary. The sum of the constant and the parameter value is used in the decryption routine (Figure 7). If no command line parameter is passed, it adds zero to the constant.
Figure 6. Command line parameter check
Figure 7. Decryption routine
If no command line parameter is passed, then the constant for the decryption routine is incorrect. This results in program crash as the decrypted code is invalid. In Figure 8 and Figure 9, we can see the decrypted code sections with and without the command line parameter, respectively.
Figure 8. Correct decrypted code
Figure 9. Incorrect decrypted code
By using this technique, Locky authors have created a dependency on the first stage downloader for the second stage to be executed properly. If a second stage payload such as this is directly analyzed, it will result in a crash.
Conclusion
As of today, the Locky spam campaign is still ongoing, with an added anti-analysis / sandbox evasion technique. We expect to see additional Locky spam campaigns and will remain vigilant in order to protect our customers.
Email Hashes
2cdf62f8aae20026418f143895c769a2009e6b9b3ac59bfa8fc79ca2f326b93a
1fd5c1f0ecc1d54324f3bdc327e7893032482a13c0914ef6f531bd93caef0a06
0ea7d59d7f1494fce8f45a1f35abb07a456de6d8d65327eca8ff84f307a49a06
22645be8553628574a7af3c32a45178e201e9af33b20b36d29b9c012b731da4c
198d8d1a89221c575d957c1f4342741f3675ebb10f95ffe3371150e124f4850e
